Australian emissions reduction subsidy policy under persistent productivity shocks by Ramezani Khansari, Fariba et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
January 2016 
Australian emissions reduction subsidy policy under persistent productivity 
shocks 
Fariba Ramezani Khansari 
University of Wollongong, frk762@uowmail.edu.au 
Charles Harvie 
University of Wollongong, charvie@uow.edu.au 
Amir Arjomandi 
University of Wollongong, amira@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers 
Recommended Citation 
Ramezani Khansari, Fariba; Harvie, Charles; and Arjomandi, Amir, "Australian emissions reduction subsidy 
policy under persistent productivity shocks" (2016). Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive). 910. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/910 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Australian emissions reduction subsidy policy under persistent productivity 
shocks 
Abstract 
The implementation of emissions reduction policies in Australia has experienced significant volatility over 
the last decade and remains in doubt due to different attitudes towards such policies by policy makers. 
One of the critical concerns of policy makers is that the costs of these policies would adversely affect 
economic activity and result in larger economic volatility. This paper investigates how business cycle 
fluctuations of the Australian economy, arising from productivity shocks, would be affected under an 
abatement reduction subsidy policy in which the regulator supports abatement efforts in each period. To 
answer this question, a real business cycle (RBC) model is applied. The responses of economic and 
environmental variables to unexpected productivity shocks are presented and compared. The results 
indicate that the regulator should adjust the abatement subsidy to be pro-cycle, i.e. increase during 
expansion and decrease during recessions. 
Publication Details 
Ramezani, F., Harvie, C. & Arjomandi, A. (2016). Australian emissions reduction subsidy policy under 
persistent productivity shocks. 60th AARES Annual Conference, Canberra ACT, 2-5 February 2016 (pp. 
1-24). USA: University of Minnesota Department of Applied Economics. 
This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/910 
 Australian Emissions Reduction Subsidy Policy under 
Persistent Productivity Shocks
 Fariba Ramezania, Charles Harvieb, Amir Arjomandic
aPhD candidate, Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong, Australia
bAssociate Professor, Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong, Australia
cLecturer, Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong, Australia
Contributed presentation at the 60th AARES Annual Conference, 
Canberra, ACT, 2-5 February 2016 
Copyright 2016 by Author(s). All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for 
non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
1 
Australian Emissions Reduction Subsidy Policy under Persistent 
Productivity Shocks  
Fariba Ramezania, Charles Harvieb, Amir Arjomandic
a PhD candidate, Faculty of Busines, University of Wollongong, Australia 
b Associate Professor, Faculty of Busines, University of Wollongong, Australia 
c Lecturer, Faculty of Busines, University of Wollongong, Australia 
Abstract 
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volatility over the last decade and remains in doubt due to different attitudes towards such 
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arising from productivity shocks, would be affected under an abatement reduction subsidy 
policy in which the regulator supports abatement efforts in each period. To answer this 
question, a real business cycle (RBC) model is applied. The responses of economic and 
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results indicate that the regulator should adjust the abatement subsidy to be pro-cycle, i.e. 
increase during expansion and decrease during recessions. 
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1. Introduction 
The implementation of emissions control policies in Australia has experienced significant 
volatility over the last decade as the result of policy makers’ different attitudes towards the 
costs and benefits of such policies. The Australian emissions pricing system was introduced 
under the Clean Energy Programme by the Australian government under the Prime 
Ministership of Julia Gillard in 2011. The program included two phases: first, a fixed price, 
or a carbon tax, period commenced from 1 July 2012 and was originally planned to continue 
until 30 July 2015 when the second phase, with a variable price system under an emissions 
trading scheme, would begin. However, under the Prime Ministership of Kevin Rudd it was 
announced that this fixed price period would finish one year earlier, on 30 July 2014 
(Australian Government, 2013). This program was further changed under the Prime 
Ministership of Tony Abbott who abolished the carbon pricing system with effect from 1 July 
2014 (Australian Government, 2014a). As an alternative the government introduced the 
Emissions Reduction Fund program which came into effect on 13 December 2014 in which 
the government funds emissions reduction activities including the improvement of energy 
efficiency standards (Australian Government, 2014b). Such fluctuations are in contrast to 
Stern (2006) who discusses that a successful emissions scheme requires that the society, 
especially consumers and investors, believe that the policy will continue in the future, 
particularly in regard to high-carbon goods and services. 
To investigate the effects of the above mentioned policies on the Australian economy, 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been broadly used (Asafu-Adjaye, 
2004; Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan, 2013; Meng et al., 2013) and several sophisticate 
models such as ORANI, GTEM and G-Cubed have been developed to illustrate widespread 
interactions between economic agents. These models are all deterministic in nature ignoring 
any environmental and economic uncertainty related to environmental policies. The choice of 
environmental policy, however, depends on the size and source of uncertainty (Angelopoulos 
et al., 2010). The literature in environmental economics also highlights the role of uncertainty 
in environmental policy analysis. This literature, beginning with Weitzman (1974), shows 
that under asymmetric information conditions when the regulator cannot observe the real 
firm’s abatement costs, price-based (quantity-based) controls, such as a carbon tax (cap), will 
be an advantage if the marginal cost curve is steeper (flatter) and the marginal benefit curve is 
flatter (steeper). In order to add other types of uncertainties into environmental policy 
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analysis, we can use a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model which 
involves all sectors of the economy and is more compatible with economic theories. A great 
advantage of DSGE models is that they are micro-founded models based on the optimization 
behaviour of agents with different constraints, technology and equilibrium. DSGE models are 
also compatible with including sources of uncertainty and to be solved for exogenous shocks.  
In this paper, we study the transitions effects of abatement subsidy policy, which is similar to 
the current Australia’s emissions reduction policy, under macroeconomic uncertainty 
conditions. To this end we use a real business cycle (RBC) model to compare the dynamic 
effects of three different emissions reduction policies when productivity shocks occur.  
The literature on DSGE environmental analysis is still in a preliminary stage and mostly 
focuses on RBC models showing how environmental policies respond to economic 
fluctuations. These models were first introduced by Fischer and Springborn (2011) who apply 
an RBC model with total factor productivity (TFP) shocks to provide a comparison between 
an emissions tax, an emissions cap, and an intensity target. Another primary study in the 
environmental DSGE literature was conducted by Heutel (2012) who developed an RBC 
model with TFP shocks to show how emissions tax policies should be adjusted to business 
cycles. Following these two contributions, a few other studies have applied DSGE models for 
environmental policy analysis including Hassler and Krusell (2012), Angelopoulos et al. 
(2013), Dissou and Karnizova (2012) andAnnicchiarico and Di Dio (2015). In this paper, we 
follow the existing literature by analysing emissions reduction policies in an RBC 
framework; however, we compare the behaviour of an abatement subsidy.  We show that 
with the presence of productivity shocks, the abatement subsidy policy would affect only the 
level and not the volatility of business cycles. We also show that the subsidy should be 
implemented to be pro-cyclical, i.e. increase during expansion and decrease during recession.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model used which is calibrated in 
Section 3. The model is solved and the results are displayed and discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 provides conclusions and discusses the future research direction.   
 
2. Model 
In this paper we generally follow Heutel (2012) to obtain the structure of an environmental 
RBC model. The focus of his research is a centralised economy in which the economy’s 
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agents’ optimisation problem is the same as the social planner’s problem and there is no 
externality. He then extended his model to a decentralised economy to study the performance 
of an emissions tax under asymmetric information regarding total factor productivity shocks. 
In this paper we use a decentralised economy with an externality from pollution in which 
polluters are not automatically concerned about the costs of pollution they produce. The 
model consists of a representative producer and a representative consumer where production 
yt generates emissions mt. We outline the main structure of the model in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 
2.3 and we then specify the emissions reduction policy in Section 2.4.   
2.1. Environment 
The emissions aggregate in the atmosphere can be shown by the pollution stock xt which 
imposes negative effects on the economy in terms of damages d(xt). This damage function 
represents the loss of potential output supply due to pollution which indicates the role of 
damage as it slows down the production process. Thus, d(xt) is an increasing function that 
takes a value between 0 and 1. The stock of pollution decays at the rate of 1-η which is the 
share of pollution absorbed naturally by jungles and oceans. The stock of pollution is a 
function of domestic emissions mt and emissions from the rest of the world rowtm :
row
tt1tt mmxx   . Emissions arise from production equal to:    ttt yh1m   in which h 
shows the relationship of emissions with output for given technology, maintaining constant 
abatement. 0≤ µt ≤1 is abatement or the fraction of emissions abated in period t which can be 
done by shifting to environmental friendly technologies such as renewable energies and is 
determined by   ttt y/zg  . g(μt) is the marginal abatement cost which is proportional to 
output. This implies that total abatement spending zt is equal to the marginal abatement cost 
multiplied by total output:   ttt ygz  .  
2.2. Production Sector 
There is a representative agent who produces a commodity using capital from the last period 
kt-1. Like many other emissions reduction policy analyses (Kelly, 2005; Schumacher and Zou, 
2008; Heutel, 2012; Angelopoulos et al., 2013), labour is not included here for simplicity 
since employment fluctuation is not the interest of this study. The production function is
    1tttt kfaxd1y   in which at is total factor productivity (TFP) and is the main source 
of economic fluctuations with an expected value of 1. at evolves according to a stationary, 
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first order autoregressive process: t1tt alnaln     where ρ is the persistence parameter 
and εt is an i.i.d. normal random variable, known as the innovation shock to the productivity, 
with a mean of zero and standard deviation σ. This random variable can be occurs once each 
period and can be observed by agents at the beginning of that period. Here, the externality of 
pollution arises as the firm does not consider the effects of emissions it produces although it 
receives damage from the stock of pollution. This assumption is plausible in a competitive 
market in which there are many identical small firms, each chooses the optimal level of 
abatement (and thus, emissions) while they receive damages from the aggregate of pollution 
from domestic emissions and emissions from the rest of the world. In such a market the firm 
is sufficiently small that it ignores the impact of emissions it produces on the entire stock of 
pollution (and thus, on damages) and takes the stock of pollution as given when it chooses 
abatement. The firm maximises profit by choosing the appropriate level of abatement and 
capital. The profit function is determined by: t1tttt zkry    where πt is profit and rt is the 
rate of return on capital. 
2.3. Consumption Sector 
It is assumed that the economy is inhabited by rational identical households who derive utility 
from consumption of goods and services u(ct). The household can observe at at the beginning 
of each period and expect future values of at+1 and thus, maximises expected total discounted 
utility:  

0t t
t
t cuE  . The operator Et is the expectation of future values of at+1 at period t 
and β is the discount factor. The household is the owner of the firm and receives the rate of 
return on capital and profit πt, and chooses between consumption ct and investment it. The 
stock of capital depreciates at the rate of δ:   t1tt ik1k    and the budget constraint is: 
tt1ttt ickr   . 
2.4. Emissions Reduction Scenarios 
In this section, we specify four scenarios including Business-as-usual (BAU), fixed emissions 
tax, variable emissions tax and abatement subsidy. Under a BAU scenario the government 
does not make any environmental policy. Thus, there is no price on emissions and the firm 
can produce emissions at any desired level. Without any emissions policy the profit 
maximising firm is not motivated to engage in abatement activity and, consequently, it does 
not take into account the effects of emissions it produces. The firm sets the costs of 
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abatement equal to zero, i.e. zt=0, by refusing any abatement activities, i.e. μt=0. Optimising 
the profit over capital, the marginal value product of capital is set equal to the rate of return: 
   1t1ttt kf/k'fyr  . On the other hand, the consumer chooses between consumption and 
investment by maximising expected discounted utility which results in the Euler equation
       01rc'uEc'u 1t1ttt    . The household’s optimisation behaviour results in the 
same Euler equation under other scenarios as well. Using these equations we can display the 
economy under a BAU scenario as: 
    1t1ttt kf/k'fyr   (1) 
  tt yhm   (2) 
 tt1ttt ickr    (3) 
 1tttt kry   (4) 
        01rc'uEc'u 1t1ttt     (5) 
 row
tt1tt mmxx    (6) 
     )k(faxd1y 1tttt   (7) 
   t1tt ik1k    (8) 
 t1tt alnaln     (9) 
In an abatement subsidy regime, the regulator supports abatement by allocating the subsidy of 
st to the firm for any abatement effort made in each period: µt is the percentage of emissions 
abated in each period, holding output constant. We assume that the regulator is neutral as 
they levy a lump-sum tax on consumers and allocates the revenues to subsidise the abatement 
efforts. Thus, the resource constraints are:   
 ttttttt icskr    1  (10) 
 tttttt skry   1  (11) 
The subsidy motivates the firm to decrease emissions by decreasing production or making 
abatement efforts since emissions is a function of output and abatement, equation (12). The 
cost of abatement is shown by equation (13).  
    ttt yh1m   (12) 
   ttt ygz   (13) 
Under this policy the firm chooses the optimal level of abatement which maximises profit, 
equation (10), subject to equations (7), (12) and (13) which results in   ttt syg ' . 
Maximising revenue with respect to capital also leads to the optimal level of capital in each 
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period as       ttttt gkfkfyr   1/' 11 . Observing the behaviour of households and firms 
the regulator chooses the optimal path of subsidy {st} which maximises social welfare in 
terms of total discounted expected utility: 
  

0
,,,
max
t t
t
xyks
cEu
tttt
  (14) 
subject to equations (5) to (13) and 
   ttt syg '  (15) 
       ttttt gkfkfyr   1/' 11  (16) 
We can write this optimisation problem in the Lagrangian equation below: 
      
     
     }][{}{
})(
)({)(
t 1tttttt
row
t1tt
t1t1t1tt1t1t
tt1tttttt1tttt
t
0tt
kfxd1yy,smmxx
1k,yry,szk1kyu
y,szk1kyuy,szk1kyuEL











 
(17) 
 Optimising this Lagrangian with respect to abatement subsidy leads to: 
    
         0),('1),('"
),('"),(''
1 

 ttsttttstt
ttsttttst
ysmryszcu
yszcuyszcu


 
(18) 
In order to solve such a Ramsay model the regulator optimises social welfare over kt, yt and xt 
as below:  
          
          
          0'11'
),('11""
1"1''
11111
1
'
111
11






ttttttt
ttkttttt
tttt
kfaxdrcu
kyrcurcucu
cucucu



 
(19) 
      
           0),('),(''1),('1"
),('"),('1'
11 

 ttytttyttttytt
tttyttttyt
ysmkyrcuryszcu
yszcuyszcu


 
(20) 
   0)('11   tttttt xdkfa   (21) 
 
Equations (5) to (16) and (18) to (20) represent the economy under the abatement subsidy 
regime. These equations, plus those from BAU scenario, are calibrated in the next section. 
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3. Calibration  
In order to calibrate the model we first specify the general relationships of the model, such as 
the utility function and production function. Like Heutel (2012), the current research utilizes 
the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model (Nordhaus, 2008) to specify the 
functions. However, it deviates from Heutel (2012) in calibrating one of the environmental 
variables, emissions from the rest of the world. Calibrating his research to the US economy, 
Heutel (2012) assumes that emissions from the rest of the world is 3 times greater than the 
domestic emissions produced by the US. However, tying the emissions from the rest of the 
world to domestic emissions at a constant rate under emissions pricing policies would not be 
appropriate since it provides a channel to transfer the effects of domestic emissions reduction 
policies to the rest of the world emissions. In other words, if a policy affects domestic 
emissions its effect would transfer to the emissions produced by the rest of the world, which 
is not necessarily true. To avoid this we calculate the rest of the world emissions under a 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario and will keep it constant under the abatement subsidy 
policy. This assumption is consistent with the aim of this study, which is to analyse the 
performance of emissions reduction policies on Australia and not on the world economy. We 
collect the global and Australian carbon dioxide emissions data from the Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) over the period 1950-2010 (CDIAC, 2013). The data 
reveals that emissions from the rest of the world are about 30 times greater than that of 
Australia’s. Therefore, the rest of the world’s emissions are set at 30 times the steady state 
value of domestic emissions m under a BAU scenario: m  where ϑ is equal to 30. 
After specifying the functions the model is parameterised to the Australian economy. To 
parameterise our RBC model we use Australian RBC literature, such as Rees (2013), Gomez-
Gonzalez and Rees (2013), Jaaskela and Nimark (2011). The coefficient of output over 
emissions is not available in the literature and we estimate it using Australian databases 
including the Australian National Accounts (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014) and 
Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts (Australian Government, 2014c). We also use the 
Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) model to calibrate abatement 
cost and damage functions. In the latest model, RICE (2010), 198 countries of the global 
economy are divided into 12 regions in which Australia is in the Other High Income (OHI) 
group. Thus, we use the parameters of the OHI group. 
The consumption sector is calibrated first. Each period of time is set equal to a quarter. We 
use Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013) and Rees (2013) to 
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calibrate the utility discount factor β, i.e. the rate at which the consumer discounts the utility 
gained from future consumption. They all estimated β to be equal to 0.99. The capital 
depreciation rate δ is set equal to 0.02 (Rees, 2013). The consumer utility function is 
 





1
c
cu
1
t  where ζ represents the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion and is set 
to 1.661 based on Hodge et al. (2008).  
To calibrate g(μt) we use the RICE model. Nordhaus (2010) assumes that g(μt) is highly 
convex and the marginal costs of emissions abatement rises more than linearly with the 
abatement rate. He specifies   2t1tg
  where θ2 = 2.8 and θ1 is a function of time with an 
initial value of 0.07 for the OHI countries which decreases by 5 percent each decade to be 
0.029 in 50 years. Such a little change in θ1 makes us able to assume that it is constant at its 
initial value since incorporating changes in backstop technologies is not the aim of this paper. 
For calibrating η, which represents the persistence of pollution in the atmosphere, we follow 
Heutel (2012), who uses the Reilly and Anderson (1992) estimation of the half-life of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide which is 83 years and is equivalent to 0.9979 quarterly. We can 
specify the relationship between output and emissions h(yt) as    1tt yyh . We estimate 1-γ 
as the regression coefficient of the log of emissions on the log of output. To find this 
coefficient we collect the seasonally adjusted quarterly data of emissions for Australia from 
September 2001 to December 2013 from Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts 
(Australian Government, 2014c) as well as the seasonally adjusted quarterly data on 
Australian GDP for September 2001-December 2013 from the Australian National Accounts 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014). We estimated the coefficient, 1-γ, to be equal to 
0.0975. The regression results are presented in Appendix A.1.    
We set the damage function d(xt) to a linear quadratic function:   2t2t10t xdxddxd  . This 
function is calibrated using the DICE and RICE models and leads us to obtain d0=-0.0011, 
d1=-5.6629*10
-6 and d2=1.2261*10
-8. The calibration of the damage function is explaineed in 
detail in Appendix A.2. The production function is calibrated to   kkf  where 0<α<1 
shows the output elasticity of capital. Calibrating to Rees (2013) and Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Rees (2013) α equals 0.33. Finally, we use Rees (2013) to calibrate the persistence of TFP 
shocks,  , to be 0.98 while t  is a normally distributed IID shock with a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation, σ, of 0.0069. Table 1 summarises all the parameters explained above.  
                                                 
1 This can be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and is equal to 1.66. 
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Table 1: Summary of the model parameters 
Parameter Value Description Source 
α 0.33 Output elasticity of capital Rees (2013), Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Rees (2013) 
 
ζ 1.66 Risk aversion coefficient Hodge et al. (2008) 
β 0.99 Discount factor Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), 
Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013), 
Rees (2013) 
 
δ 0.02 Capital depreciation rate Rees (2013) 
 
ρ 0.98 Autocorrelation parameter 
of the productivity shock 
Rees (2013) 
 
 
σ 0.007 Standard deviation of t  Rees (2013) 
 
η 0.9979 Autocorrelation parameter 
of the pollution equation 
Heutel (2012) 
 
 
d0 -0.0011 Intercept of damage 
function  
Estimated by the authors for 
Australia from the Nordhaus (2010) 
model 
 
d1 -5.6629e
-10 Linear coefficient of 
damage function  
Estimated by the authors for 
Australia from the Nordhaus (2010) 
model 
 
d2 1.2261e
-8 Quadratic coefficient of the 
damage function 
Estimated by the authors for 
Australia from the Nordhaus (2010) 
model 
 
θ1 0.07 Abatement cost function 
coefficient 
Nordhaus (2010) 
 
 
θ2 2.8 Abatement cost function 
exponential coefficient 
Nordhaus (2010) 
 
 
1-γ 0.0975 Emissions elasticity of 
output 
Estimated by the authors from the 
Australian emissions and GDP data 
over the period Q2, 2001- Q4, 2013 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
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We substitute these equations and parameters into the model described in Section 2 to obtain 
the numerical results in the next section.  
 
4. Simulation Result  
The model does not have an analytical solution, thus we present the numerical solution here. 
We start with the steady state solutions where at is equal to the expected value of 1. The BAU 
results are used as a benchmark case to compare with the effects of abatement subsidy policy. 
The steady state of a variable b  is the value that does not change over time, i.e. bt = bt+1. A 
stability test has also been conducted to assure that the dynamics of the model is stable.Table 
2 shows the steady state levels of the economic and environmental variables when TFP is 
equal to one. The table also represents the percentage changes of variables under an 
abatement subsidy policy relative to the BAU. The simulation results indicate that an 
abatement subsidy policy can lead to emissions reductions of 6.45 percent under the subsidy 
policy. This indicates that the subsidy policy can provide motivations for a producer to 
undertake emissions abatement but this outcome comes at an economic cost. The steady state 
outcomes reveal that under the subsidy policy capital has a reduction of 4.68 relative to the 
BAU scenario percent under the abatement subsidy policy. The drop in capital, as an input, in 
the subsidy policy results in a reduction in output which can be taken into account as GDP. 
As the table shows, output decreases by 1.52 percent relative to the BAU scenario under the 
subsidy policy.   
The GDP reduction in the subsidy regime results in the lower income for households, and so 
the lower consumption as it decreases to 0.60 percent lower than BAU compared. We are 
also interested to find the welfare costs of the subsidy policy. To this end we follow the 
DSGE literature (Stockman, 2001; Lucas, 2003; Fischer and Springborn, 2011; Dissou and 
Karnizova, 2012; Annicchiarico and Di Dio, 2015) by calculating welfare costs as the 
percentage of the reduction in consumption which is needed under a policy to make the 
consumer indifferent between a BAU scenario and the policy scenario. This definition is 
similar to the percentage change in consumption from the steady state value here since utility 
is only a function of consumption. This leads us to obtain the welfare costs of 0.60 percent in 
the abatement subsidy policy.  
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Table 2: Steady-State Levels with TFP Equal to 1 
Variable BAU Emissions Reduction 
Subsidy 
(% change from 
BAU) 
Emissions (m) 1.1075 1.0361 
(-6.45%) 
 
Abatement (μ) 0 0.0625 
 
Output (y) 2.8335 2.7904 
(-1.52%) 
 
Capital (k) 32.0936 30.5901 
(-4.68%) 
 
Consumption (c) 2.1917 2.1785 
(-0.60%) 
 
Welfare Cost 0 0.60% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The above results represent the economy when TFP is equal to 1 and no shock occurs. In 
order to obtain a solution in the presence of TFP shocks, we log-linearize the model around 
the steady state values. The log-linearized model will be a good approximation of the original 
model which facilitates showing small fluctuations around steady state caused by a shock. To 
solve the log-linearized model we use the Anderson-Moore Algorithm (AMA)2 which is a 
method for solving complex problems including perfect-foresight models and for asymptotic 
constraints on non-linear models, which contain the main features of the model used in the 
current study. Then the model is coded to Matlab. The solution results can be shown 
graphically via two approaches: first, impulse response functions (IRFs) which are the 
response path of the economic and environmental variables over a period of time when a TFP 
                                                 
2 AMA was developed at the Federal Reserve Board by Anderson and Moore (1985) and evaluated by Anderson 
(2008) and Anderson (2010) and is verified as an accurate, fast available method. 
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shock occurs in the first period; second, via simulating business cycles in the economy by 
introducing a series of TFP shocks over a period of time and analysing the responses of 
variables to those shocks. We present both approaches here.  
Figure 1 displays the response path of four economic variables including TFP, capital, output 
and consumption to a one-time, transitory shock to TFP under the abatement policy. The 
shock occurs exogenously in period one at the size of one standard deviation of the 
innovation, 0.0069, and decays at the rate of 0.98. As shown by the figure such a positive 
shock results in a positive deviation of economic variables from their steady state values. The 
path of TFP is exogenous since the innovation shock occurs exogenously. The simulation is 
run for 200 periods, equal to 50 years. The result shows that the responses of economic 
variables to a one period shock are pro-cyclical, i.e. follow the same direction of the shock. 
The shock occurs in the first period and increases the productivity of capital which results in 
higher output at the same level of input. Thus, the peak of output happens in the same period 
of TFP, i.e. the first period. The increase of productivity of capital raises the firm’s demand 
for capital. However, the peak of capital does not occur at the first period since TFP is a flow 
variable while capital is stock and, thus, it takes more time, about 45 periods, equal to 11 
years, to reach its peak. Consumption is highly affected by output, capital and abatement 
costs:   t1tttt zk1kyc   . As shown by the figure a positive TFP shock leads to an 
increase in consumption which highlights the key role of income in consumption: an increase 
in income will increase consumption regardless of the direction of changes in investment and 
abatement costs. The dynamic of the consumption response, however, is affected by the path 
of capital and it does not peak in the first period, but by around period 30 equivalent to year 
7. 
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Economic Variables to a TFP Shock under an Abatement Subsidy Scenario
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Environmental Variables to a TFP Shock under an 
Abatement Subsidy Scenario 
 
The effects of a positive TFP shock on environmental variables are also presented here, in 
Figure 2. The figure displays the response path of abatement, emissions, abatement costs, 
variable emissions tax rate and subsidy rate when the same TFP shock occurs. As the figure 
shows, the impulse response function of abatement is pro-cyclical under the subsidy system, 
i.e. follows the same direction of the shock. This is due to the fact that under a subsidy 
scenario the firm’s choice of abatement is affected by not output as well as the subsidy rate. 
The first relationship, i.e. with output is affected by the sign of γ, θ1 and θ2. As explained in 
Section 3, 1-γ represents the emissions elasticity of output and, thus, it is strongly positive, 
calculated as 0.0975. Also, θ1 and θ2 determine the relationship between abatement and 
abatement cost which are positive, and calibrated to be 0.007 and 2.8 respectively. These 
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positive parameters result in a negative relationship between abatement and output which 
means that a positive TFP shock which increases output leads to a decrease in abatement.  
To investigate how the subsidy would be affected by a shock the IRF of subsidy is simulated 
and displayed in Figure 2. As shown by the figure the response path of subsidy is pro-
cyclical. Also, since the subsidy is a function of current and expected future consumptions, it 
follows the consumption path and peaks in period 30, year 7. Therefore, an increase in TFP 
leads to an increase in output and subsidy. The subsidy increase motivates the firm to 
decrease emissions by increasing abatement while the increase in productivity, and 
consequently output, signals the firm to allocate resources to production rather than 
abatement. Thus, analytically, the change in abatement is ambiguous but the simulation result 
is remarkable: the output stimulus is more significant as soon as the shock occurs and the 
abatement decreases. As time passes, however, the motivation of subsidy dominates and 
abatement increases to a positive deviation from steady state and peaks in period 60, year 15. 
The response paths of abatement costs the positive shock will simulate the subsidy to increase 
and the higher subsidy rate motivates the firm to increase the subsidy revenue by reducing 
emissions which can be done via increasing abatement at the same level of output, equation 
(12). Also, the abatement response path follows the subsidy path peaks in period 30, year 7. 
The simulation results also show that emissions increase when a positive shock occurs 
despite the changes in abatement. This finding points to the important role of output in 
emissions which results in emissions to increase to more than 0.07 percent deviation from 
steady state.  
After having discussed the IRFs of variables, we now present real business cycles here in 
which a series of exogenous shocks happen to TFP that produces business cycles, i.e. output 
expansions and recessions. Figure 3 represents the simulation time paths of output to a series 
of TFP shocks. The simulation results include an expansion from period 20 to 50 followed by 
a recession from period 50 to 80. In this figure the levels are normalised to the BAU steady 
state level of output in order to facilitate comparison. As the figure displays, making an 
abatement subsidy policy affects the steady state level of output but not the path of its 
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fluctuation. The cyclical simulation result of emissions is displays in 
 
Figure 4. Again, the levels are normalised using the BAU steady state level of emissions. As 
we expected from a one-period IRFs, the emissions path follows output under the abatement 
scenario, i.e. emissions increase during expansion and decrease during recession. Also, the 
abatement policy results in lower levels of emissions than the BAU. These findings highly 
depend on the subsidy rate fluctuations as the government should adjust it to be pro-cyclically 
to business cycles: the subsidy rate increases during expansions and decreases during 
recessions.  
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Figure 3: Business Cycle Simulation of Output under Business-as-usual (BAU) Abatement 
Subsidy (Subsidy) Scenarios when levels are normalised by BAU steady state level of output 
 
Figure 4: Business Cycle Simulation of Emissions under Business-as-usual (BAU) and 
Abatement Subsidy (Sub) Scenarios when levels are normalised by BAU steady state level of 
emissions 
5. Conclusion  
Australian emissions reduction policies have experienced several changes due to different 
policy makers’ attitudes about the economic costs and environmental outcomes of such 
policies. In this paper we simulated the economic and environmental effects of an abatement 
subsidy policies which is the current policy implemented in Australia. The results showed 
that such a policy results in an emissions reduction but at an output decrease and welfare cost 
compared with a BAU scenario. In a stochastic situation and in the presence of a TFP shock 
an emissions subsidy can encourage polluters to move to cleaner technologies such as 
renewable energies when a positive TFP shock occurs. The real business cycle results also 
showed that implementing an abatement subsidy policy only affects the steady state level of 
output and emissions not the path of its fluctuation. The policy implication of this finding is 
that the regulator should set the subsidy to be pro-cyclical to business cycles: they increase 
during expansion and decrease during recessions. Note that the abatement subsidy findings 
are for the scenario specified here in which the firm receives a subsidy for its abatement 
effort in each period and the policy is run for a long period, which may be different from the 
Emissions Reduction Fund program which is planned to continue only for 5 years. 
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In this paper, we explored how the Australian economy under an emissions reduction policy 
would response to TFP shocks. As a small open economy Australian business cycles are 
affected not only by domestic shocks such as that of TFP but also by foreign shocks. In future 
work, we intend to tailor the model to the Australian economy even more by extending our 
analysis to the performance of emissions reduction policies in the presence of foreign shocks. 
Finally, we will conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate the dependence of our findings to 
parameter values. The sensitivity analysis is necessary here especially for environmental 
parameters such as the damage function and abatement costs which still remain unknown and 
a change in any of them could significantly change the results. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Estimation of Output in the Emission Equation 
The emissions at each period    ttt yh1m   is a function of output, h(yt), which is 
specified as    1tt yyh . In order to obtain the exponential coefficient 1-γ  quarterly data for 
Australia’s emissions and GDP are used here, from Australia’s National Greenhouse 
Accounts (Australian Government, 2014c) and the Australian National Accounts (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014) respectively, for the period of  September 2001-December 2013. 
Using this data the exponential coefficient can be found by regressing the log of emissions on 
the log of output. The regression result is presented in Table A.1. As shown in the table, the 
coefficient, 1-γ, is equal to 0.0975. 
 
Table A.1: Regression of Log CO2 Emissions on Log Output 
Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.8789 
       R Square 0.7725 
       Adjusted R 
Square 0.7678 
       Standard 
Error 0.0056 
       Observations 50 
       
         ANOVA 
        
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
   Regression 1 0.0051 0.0051 163.0349 0.0000 
   Residual 48 0.0015 0.0000 
     Total 49 0.0066     
   
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Intercept 1.5923 0.0416 38.2942 0.0000 1.5087 1.6759 1.5087 1.67592 
LOG(GDP) 0.0975 0.0076 12.7685 0.0000 0.0821 0.1128 0.0821 0.11282 
 
A.2. Damage Function Calibration 
In order to calibrate the environmental damage function due to pollution, we follow Heutel 
(2012) and the benefits from the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy 
(DICE) to specify the damage function. While the DICE model provides a large, complicated 
environmental-economic model, we simplify its damage function to a quadratic function. To 
23 
 
this end, we briefly explain the DICE model and then present the simplification process. The 
DICE model represents the global economic and environmental aspects of climate change. 
The model is extended to a regionally disaggregated version in RICE. In both the DICE and 
RICE models the climate change damage function is specified in terms of output lost due to 
global warming. In the DICE model, Nordhaus (2008) specifies three reservoirs for the 
carbon cycle: carbon in the atmosphere MAT(t), in the upper oceans MUP(t) and in the deep 
oceans MLO(t). Carbon can flow between these adjacent reservoirs. Nordhaus (2008) specifies 
the relationships between these three reservoirs as follows: 
        1tM1tMtEtM UP21AT11AT    (22) 
        1tM1tM1tMtM LO32UP22AT12UP    (23) 
      1tM1tMtM LO33UP23LO    (24) 
E(t) represents the emissions produced in period t and φij are the flow parameters between the 
reservoirs. Then the relationship between the reservoirs, or the accumulation of carbon, and 
climate change is specified. The accumulation of GHGs increases radiative forcing3 which 
leads to the warming of the earth’s surface. 
          tF1750M/tMlogtF EXATAT2   (25) 
F(t) represents the change in total radiative forcing of GHGs since 1750 (as the post-
industrial period) from anthropogenic sources such as carbon dioxide. FEX(t) is the exogenous 
forcing from other long-lived greenhouse gases. The forcing radiative warms the atmosphere, 
which in turn warms the upper oceans layers and then, gradually, the deep oceans.  
              1tT1tT1tTtF1tTtT LOAT3AT21ATAT    (26) 
         1tT1tT1tTtT LOAT4LOLO    (27) 
TAT(t) and TLO(t) are respectively the mean surface temperature and the temperature of deep 
oceans. Finally, the economic impact of climate change, or the damages Ω, arises from the 
mean surface temperature. 
       2AT2AT1 tTtTt    (28) 
As Nordhaus (2008) explains this damage function is estimated for the temperature increase 
in the range of 0-3°C and the damage function is not virtually existent for warming above 
3°C as the evidence of such  temperature raising is highly limited. 
                                                 
3 Radiative forcing represents the perturbation in the radiative energy of the climate system which results in 
changes in the climate parameters and leads to a new equilibrium state of the climate system (IPCC, 1990; 1992; 
1994).    
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Equations (22) to (28) represent carbon dioxide contributions to global warming damage. We 
summarise the above relationships by modelling the damage as a direct function of the stock 
of pollution. To this end the DICE (2008) equations of radiative forcing, the atmospheric, 
ocean temperatures and the damage, equations (25) to (28), are used to find the damages for 
100 values of the pollution stock, ranging from 600 Giga tons of carbon (GtC) to 1200 GtC. 
This helps us to find the damage function for the pollution stock in the atmosphere, or the 
carbon mass, of 600-1200 GtC. In order to obtain the damage function for Australia in this 
research, RICE (2010) is used to calibrate the damage coefficients where ψ1=0 and 
ψ2=0.1564. Plotting such a damage function over the carbon mass of 600-1200 GtC leads to 
obtaining the relationship between the damage function and the carbon mass as presented in 
Figure A. 1. As the figure shows there is a quadratic relationship between the carbon mass 
and output such as that given by   2t2t10t xdxddxd  . This leads us to obtain d0=-0.0011, 
d1=-5.6629*10
-6 and d2=1.2261*10
-8. These parameters represent the fraction of output lost 
due to a 1GtC increase in the stock of pollution which can be interpreted as the effects of 
pollution on the Australian economy.  
 
Figure A. 1: The Economic Damages from the Stock of Pollution in Australia 
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